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Abstract 
Litigation settlement is one of the most applicable 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Litigants 
need not exhaust their resources in order to solve their 
disputes.  However, administrative settlement is 
comparatively rarer than it is in civil disputes.  Major 
reasons for the rareness of administrative settlement 
are the consideration of public suspicion and difficulty 
of balancing private and public interests, either of 
which applies to settlement achieved during 
administrative trial proceeding.  When settling 
administrative disputes, stipulated procedural 
requirements are to be satisfied before entering into 
substantial issues.  For instance, whether litigants have 
power of disposition of the disputed issues, or should 
the relevant third parties be notified to intervene?  
Once procedural requirements are met, what factors 
should the government agency or the trial court 
consider in order to grant that settlement, for instance, 
the maintenance of the public interest?  This article 
illustrates the administrative settlement procedure of 
Taiwan, particularly of that of administrative litigation 
settlement.  For better understanding, this article will 
take the settlement between Qualcomm and Taiwan 
Fair Trade Commission for example.  Through this 
example, one can better comprehend how settlement 
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is processed from beginning to end.  Along with the 
elucidation of the example, this article responds to the 
pro and con opinions regarding the Qualcomm case as 
well.  The content of the settlement and the response 
enunciated in this article might not adequately satisfy 
every involved party or critic; however, they do 
provide valuable information for those who wish to 
continue their research in depth on this domain. 
Keywords:  Qualcomm, Litigation Settlement, Public Interests, 
Power of Disposition, Government Agency, Agency Action, Judicial 
Review  
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I. PREFACE 
In light of the doctrine of the separation of powers1 and the 
principle of acting in accordance with the law, government agencies2 
are delegated by Congress3 with the authorities to formulate policies, 
to make rules4 that relate to its authority, and to provide services to 
 
1 The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches are supposed to form 
a check and balance system, through which each branch can practice its function 
as described by Chief Justice John Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 
46 (1825): 
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the 
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the 
law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of 
the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a 
subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter 
unnecessarily.  
Marshall’s explanation of government branches properly depicts the 
nexus among them. 
2 Just like 5 U.S.C. § 551, Art. 3 ¶ 2 of the Taiwan Administrative 
Procedure Act (TAPA) exempts the following organizations from the law:  (1) 
People’s representative bodies at various levels; (2) Judicial authorities; and (3) 
Supervisory authorities.  Unlike Franklin v. Mass., 505 U.S. 788 (1992), which 
held that the United States president’s statutorily required action is not a 
reviewable administrative procedure, the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Taiwan does not make it clear whether or not the president is excluded from the 
definition of an agency of the TAPA.  Xingzheng Chengxu Fa (行政程序法) 
[Administrative Procedure Act] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Feb. 3, 
1999, amended Dec. 30, 2015) (Taiwan), Art. 3, ¶ 2, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (
全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030055 
[https://perma.cc/9H66-4D4N] [hereinafter Administrative Procedure Act].  
3 Take the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for instance.  
Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 and created the FTC 
with the authority to prohibit unfair competitive commercial activities. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 41, 45. 
4 For instance, in 2020 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) of Taiwan 
announced several rules and policies particularly applicable for prevention and 
control of the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring people to follow the promulgated 
rules and penalizing those who disobeyed:  “People must wear masks in eight 
types of public venues, and those who [refuse] to follow the rule after being 
advised to do so will be fined.” TAIWAN CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Dec. 2, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/dBMqsXbksO-
SbNf87zyfRA?typeid=158 [https://perma.cc/75WA-MA59].  The terminology of 
rules may vary; however, in accordance with their nature, rules can be divided 
into three categories as interpretive rules, procedural rules and substantive rules.  
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the people.5  In addition, government agencies can also issue orders 
in accordance with its governing statutes 6  and adjudicate 
administrative disputes7 for the first instance8 and impose sanctions 
upon those who violate the rules promulgated by the agencies.9  Once 
the government agency has issued an order or imposed a sanction 
 
See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1383, 1386 (2004) (listing the variety of policymaking tools available to 
federal agencies). 
5 For instance, government agencies provide postal services, maintain 
national parks for citizens’ leisure purposes, etc.  See WILLIAM F. FUNK & 
RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMIN. LAW 12 (5th ed. 2016) (describing various 
agencies, including those that disburse entitlements and manage federal property).  
6 These are sometimes considered the “organization acts” in Taiwan.  For 
example, the Act of the Organization of Intellectual Property Office of Taiwan 
enumerates the authorities of that agency.  Jingji Bu Zhihui Caichan Ju Zuzhi 
Tiaoli (經濟部智慧財產局組織條例) [Act of the Organization of Intellectual 
Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Nov. 4, 1998, amended Dec. 28, 2011) (Taiwan), FAWUBU 
FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the 
Republic of China], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0000061 
[https://perma.cc/8D8F-CG2M].  
7 Though administrative statutes in Taiwan do not explicitly detail that 
government agencies can “adjudicate” administrative controversies, government 
agencies are, same as that of Art. Ⅲ, §1 of the United States Constitution, 
delegated by the legislature branch with the authority to take the first review of 
the actions made by their subordinates.  See Suyuan Fa (訴願法) [Administrative 
Appeal Act] (promulgated by the Executive Yuan, Mar. 24, 1930, amended June 
27, 2012) (Taiwan), Art. 1, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws 
and Regulations Database of the Republic of China], 
https://1aw.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=GO400001 
[https://perma.cc/AZ7S-VFTM] [hereinafter Administrative Appeal Act].  
8 According to Art. 71 of the Patent Act of Taiwan, when the validity of 
a previously granted patent is challenged, the Specific Patent Agency will conduct 
a hearing in order to make its decision.  Zhuanli Fa (專利法) [Patent Act] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, May 29, 1944, amended May 
1, 2019) (Taiwan), Arts. 71, 74, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) 
[Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawHistory.aspx?pcode=J0070007 
[https://perma.cc/XUM7-394S].  
9 STEVEN J. CANN, ADMIN. LAW 14 (4th ed., 2006); see, e.g., Pierce v. 
SEC, 786 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concerning an SEC investigation 
into a trading scheme).  
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upon a person,10 the dissatisfied person who directly receives the 
agency action 11  or those who are to be adversely affected or 
aggrieved by the action may have standing to seek judicial review12 
should they be able to prove that the government agency has legally 
erred in making the action.13  When reviewing, the court can either 
sustain or reverse the government agency’s action, or issue a writ of 
mandamus14 compelling the agency that received the complaint to 
readdress its action in accordance with the judgment.15  Also after 
 
10 Like the Administrative Procedure Act of the United States, a “person” 
normally includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or 
private organization other than an agency.  See Taiwan Administrative Procedure 
Act Art. 96. 
11 A government agency’s action sometimes may be referred to as 
“administrative action” or “administrative disposition” in Taiwan.  5 U.S.C. § 
551(13) defines that agency action “includes the whole or a part of any agency 
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure 
to act,” whereas TAPA section 92 ¶ 1 defines “administrative disposition” as “a 
unilateral administrative act with direct external effects, rendered by an 
administrative authority in making a decision or taking other actions within its 
public authority, in respect to a specific matter in the area of public law.”  The 
similarity shared in these actions is that the government agency action is a 
unilateral administrative act which creates legal effect to public or specific 
persons. 
12 Judicial review is only available for what has been characterized as an 
“agency action” in substance.  See Pharm. Mfs. Ass’nv. v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp. 
1224 (D. Md. 1971) (contemplating whether there was “agency action”); 
Trucking Ass’n v. U.S., 755 F.2d 1292, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing the 
petition for review because the report did not constitute a “final agency action”). 
13 When proving relevance, one should explain the traceability or 
causality between the government agency action and the damages he has suffered 
or the rights that have been affected.  See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976) (holding that a federal court can only redress an injury that 
can be fairly traced to the challenged action of a government agency); Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (holding that judicial review turns on whether an 
administrative opinion constitutes “final agency action”). 
14 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); Xingzheng Susong Fa (行政訴訟法) 
[Administrative Litigation Act] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Nov. 17, 
1932, amended Jan. 15, 2020) (Taiwan), Art. 5, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國
法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030154 
[https://perma.cc/QA49-3T8W] [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Act]. 
15 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).  Same as 
Germany, the court may specifically instruct the government agency to redress an 
action or decision which fully or partly meets the claims of the plaintiff.  In 
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having inquired about litigants’ willingness, the court may resort 
disputes to alternative resolutions when appropriate and fair. 
Since the actions of government agencies are closely related 
to the daily conduct of people, 16  the administrative actions must 
conform to certain norms and not violate the fundamental principles 
of administrative law,17 such as the principle of proportionality,18 the 
principle of prohibition of arbitrary and capricious, 19  and the 
principle of equality20.  And since the executive branch is originally 
 
Germany, those legal actions are called “Verpflichtungsklage”.  See 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [Administrative Court Code] § 42. 
16 U.S. v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Frankfurter, opined that: 
It is not consistent which the theory of our government that the 
legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous crime, 
find the fact of guilt, and adjudge the punishment by one of its own 
agents . . .   It must be remembered that the deportation proceeding is an 
exercise of adjudicative, not rule-making, power.”  This case properly 
illustrates how an agency action can affect citizens’ lives and what 
attribute an agency action should be construed 
17 Parts of those principles are explicitly stipulated in the law, and parts 
of them are inferred from the laws, mainly the Administrative Procedure Act.  
Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 7. 
18 In the common law system, the term “principle of proportionality” is 
not a term that has an easily discernible meaning as it does in the civil law system.  
See George A. Bermann, The Principle of Proportionality, 26 AM. J. COMPAR. L., 
415(1978). (“American law, in short, provides no easy answer to the question of 
proportionality in administrative action.”). 
19 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  A similar regulation is found in Art. 10 of the 
Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act, which states:  “[in] exercising 
administrative discretion, an administrative authority shall not transgress the 
scope of its power of discretion set forth by law and shall comply with the 
purposes of the authority conferred by law or regulations.”  Administrative 
Procedure Act, Art. 10.  See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that an agency rule would be arbitrary 
and capricious if the agency relied on factors which Congress had not intended it 
to consider). 
20 “The so-called ‘equality principle’ means that unless the 
administrative agency has justifiable reason, it cannot commit administrative 
actions or treat the object differently.”  Jian Nan Co. v. Intellectual Property 
Office, Zuigao Xinzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative 
Court], 88 Pan Zi No. 3724 (88年度判字第 3724號判決) (1999) (Taiwan).  The 
judgment fully illustrates that if people are situated in the same conditions, the 
government agency should, when taking any administrative action, treat every 
person equally unless otherwise permitted by law. 
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entrusted by the people as the major branch of the government to 
execute administrative activities, 21  it must take into account the 
balance between the public interest and private rights when 
implementing its duties.22  As the actions of government agencies are 
supposed to balance both public and private interests, questions arise: 
should the punitive agency action continue to be executed if the 
involved parties’ interests later change,23 or should the agency settle 
the dispute with the party subject to the agency decision when 
circumstances surrounding the decision become unfavorable? 24  
These questions turn into critical issues not only for the government 
agency who initiated the action but also for the trial court. 
This article will enunciate the settlement procedure in an 
administrative litigation in Taiwan, and what factors shall the court 
consider in accordance with the law.  For better understanding, this 
 
21 In democratic states, the executive branches’ authority is normally 
delegated by the legislative branch, whose members are elected by the people; 
therefore, the executive branches’ authority is considered indirect delegation by 
the people.  See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS 35 (5th ed. 2004). 
22 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (evaluating whether 
the termination of public assistance payments without an opportunity to be heard 
violated plaintiff’s due process rights). 
23 The Taiwan Administrative Litigation Act Art. 203 ¶ 1 states that 
“When the situation changed unexpectedly after the public contract had been 
established, and the performance of that original contract is therefore considered 
unfair, the administrative court may, upon the request of the parties, replace the 
content of that contract by increasing, reducing the payment or changing, 
eliminating the original effect of that contract with a judgment,” whereas ¶ 2 
regulates that “The administrative agency, as one of the involving parties, for the 
sake of preventing public interests from suffering apparently significant harm, 
may also in accordance with the preceding paragraph petition to the court to 
replace the original contract with a judgment.”  Administrative Litigation Act, 
supra note 14, Art. 203, paras. 1–2.  This stipulation is considered the “principle 
of situation variation.” 
24 Whether government agencies are able to settle disputes with private 
counterparts has been a controversial issue in the administrative law domain.  
Negative opinion believes that government agencies can only process public 
affairs in accordance with the laws without sacrificing public interest, however, 
positive opinion considers that it is not as good as settlement when government 
agencies have to exhaust a great amount of public resources for a vague result of 
fact and legal disputes.  See CHEN CHING-HSIOU, ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION 
LAW, 567–568 (2013) (outlining the supporting and dissenting opinions for 
administrative litigation settlement). 
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article will also introduce the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan 
(TFTC) sanction of Qualcomm Inc. for violating the Fair Trade Act 
between 2015 and 2017.  This case ended with a court settlement, 
which precisely depicts how an administrative dispute can be settled 
through an alternative resolution procedure rather than through the 
courts.  
II. SETTLEMENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION 
Litigation settlements normally achieve dual effects.25  One 
effect is the termination of the trial procedure,26 and the other is the 
resolution of substantial disputes between litigants.27  When litigants 
agree to settle their disputes, the content of the settlement will then 
supersede the original claims for which the plaintiff sued 28 .  In 
administrative litigation, the original agency actions will be replaced 
by the content of the settlement, which means the government agency 
bears the obligation to cancel or revoke the original actions and will 
be bound by the conditions of the settlement.29  Since the content or 
conditions of the settlement will replace the original agency action, 
the content or conditions of the settlement should then tightly connect 
 
25 Chang Wun-Yu (張文郁), Xingzheng Susong zhi Susong Hejie (行政
訴訟之訴訟和解) [Litigation Settlement in Administrative Litigation], 108 
TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) [Taiwan L.J.] 116, 116 (2008). 
26 WU GENG, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 707 
(2008); TSAI CHI-FANG, NEW THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF LAW, 338 
(2007). 
27 TSAI, supra note 26, at 339. 
28 Chang, supra note 25, at 131. 
29 As regulated in Taiwan Administrative Litigation Act (TALA) Art. 
222 that “If the settlement is established, its effect shall be governed by the 
provisions of Art. 223, Art. 214 and Art. 226.”  Art. 214 ¶ 1 states “[i]n addition 
to the parties, the determination of the judgment is also effective for those who 
are the successors of the parties and those who occupy the subject matter of the 
request for the parties or their successors.”   Additionally, Art. 216 ¶ 1 stipulates 
that “[a] judgment that revokes or changes the original sanction or decision shall 
have the effect of binding the relevant agencies in relation to the incident.”  In 
accordance with the articles mentioned above, the conditions of the settlement 
shall have binding power to the involved litigants as well as various government 
agencies once the settlement has been completed.  Administrative Litigation Act, 
supra note 14, Arts. 222, 214, 216.  See also, CHEN MIN, GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 1560 (2007) (laying out the previously 
mentioned TALA articles). 
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to the subject matters of the litigation or the disputed issues.30  In 
other words, any part of the content or conditions of the settlement 
which deviate from the disputed issues will not generate any 
adjudicative effect or substantial binding power between litigants in 
future judicial dispute anyway,31 except those who participated and 
negotiated in making the settlement32.  
In fact, aside from litigation settlement, government agencies 
themselves may also settle disputes with people before the agency 
action or sanction is made.  Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act 
(TAPA) article 136 states:  “Where an administrative authority is 
unable to determine the facts or the legal relations as the basis for an 
administrative disposition notwithstanding an inquisition process 
having been conducted ex officio, it may enter into a compromise or 
an administrative contract with a citizen in lieu of administrative 
 
30 CHEN, supra note 29, at 1558.  For instance, according to Art. 7 of 
TALA, “[w]hen an administrative lawsuit is filed, it is possible to combine claims 
for damage or other property payments in the same procedure.”  Therefore, when 
negotiating for the contents of settlement, damages can be a negotiable issue 
along with the issues the plaintiff initially claimed for, even though the damages 
issue was not mentioned in beginning.   
31 However, in German practice litigants may also settle any legal 
disputes that relate to the subject matters of the litigation.  The Administrative 
Court Act of Germany Art. 106 states:  
In order to completely or partly deal with the legal 
dispute, those concerned may reach a settlement for 
the record of the court, or of the commissioned, or 
requested judge insofar as they are able to dispose 
of the subject-matter of the settlement.  A judicial 
settlement may also be concluded by those 
concerned accepting a proposal of the court, of the 
presiding judge or of the reporting judge issued in 
the form of an order, in writing vis-a-vis the court. 
Similarly, some Taiwanese scholars believe that litigants are not bound 
to the disputed subject matters when negotiating for the content of the settlement.  
See LIOU TZONG-DER & PENG FENG-ZHI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 496 (Weng 
Yueh-Sheng ed., 3d. ed. 2006) (stating that the content of settlements must be 
related to but does not need to be the same as the content of litigations); CHEN, 
supra note 24, at 570 (stating that the content of settlements are not limited to 
litigated matters). 
32 See CHANG WUN-YU, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, INTERLEAVING OF 
SUBSTANTIALITY AND PROCEDURE 270–271 (2014) (explaining that content or 
conditions exceeding the sorted disputes may still have binding power among 
participating parties in other civil litigation as a settlement made in private). 
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disposition in order to settle the dispute and to effectively achieve the 
purpose of administration.” 33   According to the article, the 
government agency may settle disputes with people either for the sake 
of insufficient information of the fact which it has been inquiring into, 
or for the uncertainty of the complexity of the legal issues.34  In line 
with the conditions illustrated above, one can easily understand that 
cost is the major concern.35  The above mentioned settlement, also 
known as the “administrative settlement,” as depicted by the plain 
meaning of the text of the article, can only be implemented when the 
government agency failed to acquire sufficient factual and legal 
information which is necessary for the agency to make its final 
actions accordingly.  In other words, the government agency must 
have substantially engaged in the investigation of the fact and the 
collection of necessary evidence for the making of the final agency 
action and only when it was unable to complete that task can it then 
enter into a settlement with the citizen.36  The government agency 
cannot simply choose to settle the dispute without first taking 
measures to deal with any current controversies related to the case.  
Settlement shall not be regarded as an alternative relief for the 
government agency’s inaction.37  
 
33 Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 136. 
34 Id.  The administrative settlement proceeding among government 
agencies and parties or persons is not mandatory in any form.  Its purpose is to 
facilitate the ability to use the various forms of alternative dispute resolution, 
same as the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–584. 
35 Chang, supra note 25, at 125. 
36 See Lin Ming-Chiang (林明鏘), Xingzheng Qiyue Falun—Yi Deguo 
Xingzheng Qiyuefa Wei Zhongxin Shipping Fawubu Xingzheng Chengxu Fa 
Minguo Bashisannian Siyue Caoan (行政契約法論—以德國行政契約法為中心
試評法務部行政程序法民國八十三年四月草案) [The Theory of Administrative 
Contract Law—A Trial Review of the Draft of the Administrative Procedure Law 
of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of China in April 1993 in Accordance 
with the Administrative Contract Law of Germany], 24 (國立臺灣大學法學論叢) 
[NAT. TAIWAN UNI. L. J.], 143, 174 (1994) (discussing Certain types of 
administrative disputes that are not suitable for settlement due to specific 
attributes, for instance the approval of a physician license, test assessment, etc.). 
37 See PAUL STELKENS, HEINZ JOACHIM BONK & MICHAEL SACHS, 
VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ, 8. 2014, §55 Rn. 34 (discussing some 
German scholars’ belief that the government agency must have engaged in the 
fact finding procedure first, and only when insufficient evidence is collected can it 
enter into settlement with that specific person).  See also Sheng Tzu-Lung (盛子
龍), Dangshiren Dui Susong Biaodi Zhi Chufenquan Zuowei Xingzheng Susong 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/2
438 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 16 
 
Compared with the administrative settlement, in litigation 
settlements the government agency does not have to prove that it has 
exhausted its ability yet is still unable to acquire sufficient factual or 
legal information in order to enter into a litigation settlement with the 
counterpart.38  Litigation settlement only occurs during the time the 
disputes have been docketed at the court, where the legality and 
legitimacy of the agency action have become the subject matter 
waiting to be reviewed.  In other words, to what extent the 
government agency tried to acquire the necessary information would 
not then be one of the issues that needs to be scrutinized.  
Despite the differences between settlements made at the 
government agency investigation stage and those made before the 
court, there are still several common elements between them which 
will be discussed below.  
The Timing of the Settlement 
Article 219 paragraph 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act 
of Taiwan (TALA) states:  “The litigation parties who have the right 
to dispose of the subject matter of the action, and when the settlement 
does not prejudice the maintenance of the public interest, the 
administrative court may, irrespective of the phase of the proceeding 
reached, try to settle at any time.  A commissioned judge or an 
assigned judge is also authorized to do so.”  According to the text of 
the TALA article, the settlement can be carried out at any time during 
the proceedings, regardless of the phases of the case.39  Moreover, 
 
Shang Hejie Zhi Rongxuxing Yaojian (當事人對訴訟標的之處分權作為行政訴
訟上和解之容許性要件) [Litigants’ Disposition Rights over Subject Matters as 
an Admissible Element of Reconciliation in Administrative Litigation], 
XINGZHENG SUSONG ZHI YANTAO (YI) (行政訴訟之研討(一)) [COMPILATION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION SEMINARS (VOL. 1)]  27-28, (Administrative 
Litigation Seminar ed., 2012) (arguing that settlements do not waive or lower the 
standard of the investigating duty of government agencies). 
38 Administrative Litigation Act Art. 219 does not contain the same 
conditions as enumerated in Administrative Procedure Act Art. 136. 
39 In Germany, it is also commonly believed that despite the jurisdiction 
and other procedural errors, litigants still can settle their disputes at a court where 
legitimacy is considered controversial.  See MARTIN REDEKER, HANS-JOACHIM 
VON OERTZEN, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG, 13 Aufl., 2000, §106 Rn. 5 
(stating that the settlement process can be concluded at every stage of the 
procedure, and it is not necessary that the action be admissible); ERICH 
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even if the case has gone through the oral debate process, before the 
court has made its final decision, the settlement can still proceed.40  
However, the best timing for settlement would be at the beginning 
stage of the case, before the court investigates the substantive matters, 
and before the parties enter into the discovery stage requiring 
investigation of the physical matters or to debate over the sorted 
issues.  The earlier the parties reach a settlement, the less time and 
cost both the court and involved parties may have to spend.  If the 
parties express a willingness to settle after the final oral argument, the 
court must reopen the hearing process so that the case can be returned 
back to the trial stage again before the settlement proceedings can 
proceed.  In German practice, the civil law system where Taiwan’s 
legal system originated from, a settlement can still be advanced even 
if the court has made its final judgment.  In this situation, the 
judgment will be lapsed by the settlement. 41   However, such a 
situation may not exist in Taiwan’s litigation practice, because once 
the court has made a final decision, the case would theoretically be 
considered completed and would not be possible to generate any 
room to establish a “litigation settlement.”42 
As is done in litigation settlement, the government agency 
may compromise with the persons before the supposed government 
actions have been made43.  However, it is still not clear whether the 
government agency can settle amid the time the government agency 
has made its final action yet the dispute hasn’t been docketed at the 
court.  According to TAPA article 128, the government agency can 
revoke its finished action at any time if it is found to be imperfect 
later, therefore, once the government action is abolished by the 
 
EYERMANN, HARALD GEIGER, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG, 14. AUFL., 
2000, §106 Rn. 3, 20.  However, in Taiwan some scholars believe that the court 
that hears the case should transfer the case to the legitimate one instead of moving 
on to the settlement procedure.  See CHANG, supra note 32, at 259 (stating that 
courts without jurisdiction to hear cases should transfer them to the appropriate 
venue rather than proceeding with settlement). 
40 Some scholars believe that even during appeal, litigants can still settle 
their disputes.  See generally CHEN CHI-NAN, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol. 
Ⅱ. 297 (2001). 
41 REDEKER, VON OERTZEN, supra note 39, at § 106 Rn. 11; EYERMANN, 
GEIGER, supra note 39, at § 106 Rn. 11. 
42 Chang, supra note 25, at 117. 
43 LUO CHUAN XIAN (羅傳賢), XINGZHENG CHENGXU FALUN (行政程序
法論) [TREATISE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT] 245 (2017). 
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government agency itself, the situation for settlement may emerge 
regardless of whether the dispute has been filed at the court or not.  
However, for the prevention of unnecessary suspicion from the public, 
it is less likely the government agency would settle with persons in 
private before or after the dispute has been filed with the court.44  The 
timing of the settlement is a complicated consideration of sensitivity 
and wisdom, especially more so for administrative disputes rather 
than for civil controversies.  
Parties Involved in a Settlement 
Since article 219 paragraph 1 of the TALA states that “the 
litigation parties . . . try to settle at any time,” all parties who are 
involved in the litigation can participate in the settlement process.45  
And according to article 23 of the TALA, the so-called litigation 
parties refer to the plaintiff, the defendant, and persons who are 
permitted by the court to intervene in the proceedings.46  As a result, 
the persons who suffered from the agency action, normally the 
plaintiff, the government agency who initiated the agency action, 
normally the defendant, and those whose interests are affected by the 
agency action, normally the intervener, are allowed to participate in 
the proceedings of the settlement process.47  As to the possibility of 
participation in the settlement proceedings of a third person who is 
not a plaintiff, defendant, nor intervener, in accordance with article 
219 paragraph 2 of TALA, those who are not litigation parties may 
not be able to participate in the settlement proceedings unless it is 
deemed necessary by the court, and notifications are served to the 
 
44 Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 128.  Since 
administrative settlement is conditioned on the basis regulated in TAPA Art. 136 
that “[w]here an administrative authority is unable to determine the facts or the 
legal relations as the basis for an administrative disposition . . . , it may enter into 
a compromise or an administrative contract with a citizen in lieu of administrative 
disposition . . . ” (emphasis added) it would be pretty peculiar for the government 
agency to abolish its previous action which was made based on the determined 
facts and legal relations in exchange for entering into a settlement with the citizen 
before the administrative dispute is filed with the court.  Id. Art. 136. 
45 Id. Art. 129. 
46 Id. Art. 23. 
47 See CHANG, supra note 32, at 254–57 (explaining how parties can 
participate in the settlement process to seek for remedies). 
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third party accordingly.48  In addition, if the settlement proceedings 
are handled by the attorneys, a specific extra authorization of that 
power of the attorneys is required by law before they can actually 
handle the settlement proceedings on behalf of the parties.49  
Compared with litigation settlement, the government agency 
in accordance with the law does not have to notify any person who is 
not supposed to be issued an agency action, nor the persons whose 
rights might not be directly affected, in order to complete the 
administrative settlement.50  One major reason for this is because an 
administrative settlement normally occurs early before the 
government agency has made its action.  At this stage, the disputes 
only exist between the government agency and the person to which 
the agency action is likely to be issued.  Since the agency action 
hasn’t yet been issued, those who are going to be indirectly affected 
by the not yet existing agency action would then have no standing to 
participate in the administrative settlement, and the government 
agency does not have to notify any indirectly affected person to 
participate in the administrative settlement either.51  
However, it is still unclear as to what is considered a relevant 
connection to the disputes a person should have in order to qualify 
them to intervene in litigation.  No clear rule or standard of relevancy 
has the court expressed for persons to take a self-review of the 
possibility of participation of litigation in advance.  It is subject to the 
court’s discretion whether to permit any third party to intervene in 
litigation on a case by case basis.52  Depth of the involvement of the 
dispute or the scale of the influence to the third person constitutes the 
 
48 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219. 
49 Art. 51 ¶ 1 of TALA states that “[t]he trial attorney shall have the right 
to act in all litigation on the matter of their appointment. However, rejection, 
acceptance, withdrawal, settlement, counterclaim, appeal or retrial, and the 
appointment of an agent cannot be done without special authorization.”  
Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 51. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Bo Kang Bao Co., v. New Taipei City Govern., Zuigao 
Xingzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) [Sup. Admin. Court], 108 Niandu Panzi No. 
108 (108年度判字第 108號判決) (2019) (Taiwan) (“而所謂利害關係乃指法律
上之利害關係，應就法律保護對象及規範目的等因素為綜合判斷” [the so-
called “interest” [of a third party] refers to the legal interest, which should be 
integrally determined in accordance with factors such as the object of legal 
protection and the purpose of regulation]). 
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factors for the court to make its decision.  Nevertheless, dissension 
over relevancy to the litigation between court and third parties isn’t 
uncommon. 
The Person Involved in the Settlement Must Have the Power of 
Disposition Over the Subject Matter 
First of all, it must be clarified what is the “subject matter” of 
a litigation.  The definition of the subject matter of litigation in 
Taiwan is widely divided,53 but the so-called subject matter of the 
litigation settlement here refers to the content or condition of mutual 
concessions promised by the parties, or the content of the acts that the 
parties agree to do or not to do. 54   The parties involved in the 
settlement proceedings must have the final discretion ability over the 
conditions or content of the settlement, which is referred to as the 
power of disposition or right of disposal.55  This rule applies to both 
administrative and litigation settlement.56  If the final decision is up 
to another person who is not involved in the settlement proceedings, 
or the negotiating parties do not have right to dispose of the disputed 
matters, the content of the settlement then contains no binding power 
to the third persons and the outcome of the settlement will be of no 
adjudicative value.57  
 
53 See Chang Wunyu (張文郁), Xingzheng Susong Zhong Chexiao 
Susong Zhi Susong Biaodi Zhi Yanjiu (行政訴訟中撤銷訴訟之訴訟標的之研究) 
[A Study on the Subject Matter of Action for Cassation], 32 FUREN FAXUE (輔仁
法學) [FU JEN L. J.] 45 (2006) (illustrating diversified interpretations regarding 
“subject matter”). 
54 As to private persons, the right of disposition of subject matters refers 
to the personal right that can be resorted to administrative remedies.  Rights 
obtained from the reflection of government agency action, policy, or those of 
public realm shall not be included.  See Sheng, supra note 37, at 11 (explaining 
the meaning of “subject matter” in the context of mutual concessions).  
55 See CHEN, supra note 29, at 1559. 
56 Id. 
57 However, this kind of settlement can be considered a settlement 
outside the litigation, which still contains civil binding power among litigants.  
See id. at 21 (explaining an approach to settlement adopted in German 
jurisdiction). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 443 
 
Settlement Must Be a Concession Among Litigants Involved58 
The purpose of the settlement in an administrative litigation 
is to replace the original government agency action with the condition 
reached in the settlement, therefore, the content of the settlement 
theoretically should be more favorable or acceptable for the person 
who received the government agency action, and relatively, the 
government agency must to some extent waive part of the 
requirements or restrictions listed in the original agency action to a 
lighter degree for that person.59  If the parties insist on their own 
views or interests and are unwilling to give in to each other, that is, 
there is no possibility of a settlement, at which situation the court will 
have to give its final decision instead of attempting to achieve a 
settlement.60  
The Outcome of Reconciliation Must Be Harmless to the Public 
Interest 
As mentioned above, settlement can only be achieved by 
mutual concession from both parties; each side must to some extent 
waive part of his or her most favorable expectation in order to replace 
the original government agency action with a more favorable result.  
And, since government agencies are supposed to maintain and secure 
social order in every aspect, it may be controversial should 
government agencies retreat and compromise with a person who was 
supposed to be sanctioned or disciplined.  In other words, can social 
order or public interest be sacrificed for or bargained away by 
authorities?  
To answer that question, one should refer to the terminology 
of the law.  The legal term stated in article 219 of the TALA is “no 
barrier to the maintenance of the public interest” instead of “good for 
the maintenance of the public interest.” 61   Therefore, the plain 
interpretation of the legal language shall be that the settlement does 
not need to generate any benefits to the public interest, and as long as 
 
58 Id. at 33–34. 
59 See Chang, supra note 25, at 122 (elaborating on the purpose of 
settlement in an administrative litigation). 
60 See CHANG, supra note 32, at 262 (explaining the concept of “mutual 
concessions”). 
61 Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 219. 
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the public interest can still be maintained, reconciliation proceedings 
may still be undergone.62  In addition, the interpretation of so-called 
“public interest” is based on the scale of overall benefits of the 
nation,63 rather than on the interests of specific groups or industries64.  
If the outcome of reconciliation is beneficial to the country as a whole, 
even if it is unfavorable to some groups or industries, it should still 
be considered unhindered to the maintenance of the public interest.65  
The court must conduct a judicial review of whether there is a conflict 
between the content of the settlement and the maintenance of the 
public interest, and if the conclusion of the review is that the 
settlement is detrimental to the maintenance of the public interest, 
then the court shall not grant it, or intervene to adjust the conditions 
of the settlement when necessary, even if the new conditions must 
slightly vary from the original. 66   However, if the conditions of 
settlement altered are conducive to the maintenance of the public 
interest, but one of the parties is unwilling to accept it, since 
settlement is a mutual concession agreed upon by the litigants 
involved, even if one of the parties expressed a desire to settle, the 
court still cannot force the party who disagreed to enter into the 
reconciliation proceedings.  Therefore, at this time the reconciliation 
proceedings should be considered not feasible. 
 
 
62 See LIOU & PENG, supra note 31 (arguing that settlements are not 
bound to addressing public interest). 
63 There is no clear definition of “public interest” either regulated by 
laws or interpreted by court rulings, and the term may vary in appearance as 
“reasonable,” “adequate,” “necessary,” “practicable,” “feasible,” or “suitable,” or 
combinations of them.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §196.37(1) (West 1957) 
(illustrating that different terms are used to define “public interest”); Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §15(4) (1970) (using, but not defining, the term 
“public interest”). 
64 Qiu Congzhi (邱聰智), Sifa shang Gonggong Liyi de Gainian yu 
Shiyong (私法上公共利益的概念與適用) [The Concept and Application of 
Public Interest in Private Law], 13 ZHONGHUA FAXUE (中華法學) [Chinese Soc’y 
L. J.] 9 (2009) (illustrating the attribution of “public interests”). 
65 Id. at 12. 
66 See LIOU & PENG, supra note 31, at 495 (explaining how the court can 
conduct a judicial review to check if a settlement is in compliance with public 
interest).  In fact, it is quite difficult for the reviewing court to determine whether 
the government agency has properly balanced public interest with private benefits 
when the agency has decided to enter into the commitment to the settlement, 
especially when the conflicting interests are equally strong against each other. 
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The Outcome of Settlement is Equivalent to that of a Judgment 
From a procedural point of view, when a settlement occurs, 
the case closes, and the parties are no longer in a litigation 
relationship.  From a substantive point of view, once the parties have 
reached a settlement in litigation, the case’s issues are generally 
resolved through judicial proceedings, and the settlement’s effect is 
equivalent to a court decision. 67   Furthermore, the settlement’s 
conditions will replace the original government action unless there 
are grounds for revocation, at which point the parties may request a 
continuation of the trial.68  Otherwise, the settlement’s outcome is 
akin to a court judgment.69  In a latter case related to a settled case’s 
subject matter, the court may not  make a judgment that is different 
from the settlement outcome.70  Further, any involved litigants cannot 
take another legal action against the other party for the same cause 
afterwards.71  However, the content of the settlement will only be 
effective between or among parties bound by settlement. 72   The 
settlement does not bind those who did not participate.73   If the 
settlement is later found to be null, void, or containing rescindable 
flaws, the parties may request that the court continue the trial within 
30 days of the settlement date74.  If the court determines that the 
 
67 TALA Art. 213 regulates that “[the] subject matter of the litigation 
refereed in the final judgment contains determined effectiveness.”  According to 
Art. 222, Art. 213 is mutatis mutandis applicable to litigation settlement.  
Administrative Legislation Act, supra note 14, Arts. 213, 222. 
68 Id. Art. 223. 
69 See e.g., SHENG, supra note 37, at 34 (demonstrating that some 
scholars, however, consider litigation settlement an expedient measure that should 
not be an equivalent to court judgments).   
70 CHEN, supra note 24, at 575. 
71 Administrative Litigation Act Art. 222 stipulates that: “Where the 
settlement is established, its effect shall be governed by Article 223, Article 214 
and Article 226,” whereas Art. 214 ¶ 1 states: “In addition to the parties, a final 
judgment is also effective for those who are the successors of the parties in the 
litigation and those who occupy the subject matter of the request for the parties or 
their successors.” 
72 Chang, supra note 25, at 131. 
73 Id. 
74 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, at Art. 224 ¶ 1. 
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settlement proceedings indeed possess flaws, the settlement may be 
withdrawn and trial proceedings may continue.75  
One interesting question is whether the settlement 
proceedings can resume once the trail proceedings continue?  The law 
accounts for the continuation of the trial proceedings but does not 
explicitly prohibit further settlement proceedings.  It therefore 
follows that the court and the parties could once again resume 
settlement proceedings to obtain a new, valid settlement. 
III. QUALCOMM V. TFTC 
Qualcomm has a leading advantage in CDMA, WCDMA, and 
LTE technologies, 76  as well as a quasi-monopoly over chips for 
mobile devices in the Taiwanese market77.  Qualcomm possesses 
quite a few patents, some of which are recognized as Standard-
Essential Patents (SEPs).78  For seven consecutive years, Qualcomm 
operated unfairly in several ways, not only to its competitors but also 
to its business partners.  Among other things, the company (1) refused 
to license its products to its competitors, with or without additional 
restrictions; (2) refused to provide chips to those who had not yet 
 
75 Administrative Litigation Act Art. 223 stipulates that: “If there are 
reasons for invalidity or revocation of the settlement, the parties may request that 
the trial be continued. ”  Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14. 
76 Cong Zhuanye Jishu Buju Lai Kan Gaotong Tongxin Jingpian 
Shichang Duzhan Diwei (從專利技術布局來看 高通通信晶片市場獨占地位) 
[Current Patent Distribution Landscape Highlights Qualcomm’s Sole 
Dominance in the Communication Chip Market], INNOVATION KNOWLEDGE 
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID=13321. 
77 Id. 
78 A Standard-Essential Patent claims an invention which must be used 
to conform to a standard.  As explained in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. 
C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, ¶ 53 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), “A given 
patent is ‘essential’ to a standard if the use of the standard requires infringement 
of the patent, even if acceptable alternatives of that patent could have been written 
into the standard.”  See also Mark A. Lemley, Intell. Prop. Rights and Standard-
Setting Orgs., 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (detailing how standard-setting 
organizations, such as Qualcomm, respond to assertions of IP rights when 
licensing their patents). 
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licensed a Qualcomm patent; and (3) provided rebates that created 
exclusive supply arrangements.79  
The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC), the sole 
competent authority of the Fair Trade Act, is responsible for 
maintaining free and fair market competition, safeguarding the 
interests of consumers, and promoting economic stability and 
prosperity.80  The Commission possesses the authority to sanction 
businesses that violate the Fair Trade Act, such as  concerted action 
or directly or indirectly prevent any other enterprises from competing 
by unfair means .81  
Responding to public reports of trade violations,82 the TFTC 
initiated an investigation into Qualcomm in 2015, involving more 
than 20 domestic and foreign mobile phone manufacturers (including 
brand manufacturers and OEMs), along with chip suppliers and 
communications equipment operators.83  In October 2017, the TFTC 
concluded that Qualcomm’s restrictive patent licensing policy in the 
mobile device chip market constituted competition restrictions that 
 
79 Qualcomm conducted its business model similarly in many territories.  
For more details, see District Court Decision in FTC v. Qualcomm Spawns 




80 Gongping Jiaoyi Fa (公平交易法) [Fair Trade Act] (promulgated by 
Fair Trade Commission, Feb. 4, 1991, amended Jun. 14, 2017) (Taiwan), Art. 1, 
FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of 
the Republic of China], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0150002 
[https://perma.cc/F83E-DWRG] [hereinafter Fair Trade Act]. 
81 Organization and Duties, FAIR TRADE COMM’N (Taiwan), 
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=198&docid=121
93 [https://perma.cc/AUL7-PU82] (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:28 PM). 
82 There were two public reports in total, one of which was later 
withdrawn.  See Gongping Jiaoyi Weiyuanhui Chufen Shu (公平交易委員會處
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violated Article 9, Section 1 of the Fair Trade Act.84  Qualcomm 
subsequently faced a NT$23.4 billion ($733 million) fine, and was 
required to:  (1) cease enforcing a contract clause, signed with chip 
competitors, that compelled them to provide sensitive distribution 
information such as chip price, sales counterparts, sale quantities, and 
product models; (2) cease its moratorium on providing chips to those 
who refused to license Qualcomm patents; (3) stop rebating specific 
companies in exchange for exclusive supply arrangements. 85  
Qualcomm paid part of the fine and filed an administrative lawsuit 
with the Intellectual Property Court (“IP Court”) against the TFTC’s 
ruling86. 
Jurisdiction 
According to Article 4, Paragraph 1 of TALA, “people whose 
legal rights or interests are infracted by illegal actions of the central 
or local authorities. . . may bring a lawsuit before the jurisdictional 
Administrative Court for a cassation judgment against the authorities 
who made the adverse actions.”87  In addition, Article 48, Paragraph 
1 of the Fair Trade Act also provides that “[where] disposition or 
decisions made by the competent authority pursuant to this Act are 
objected or challenged, the procedures for administrative litigation 
shall apply directly.”88  The TFTC is an independent government 
agency89 under the Executive Yuan (the highest executive branch in 
 
84 Fair Trade Act Art. 9 stipulates that Monopolistic enterprises shall 
not engage in any one of the following conducts:  (1) directly or indirectly 
prevent any other enterprises from competing by unfair means; (2) improperly 
set, maintain or change the price for goods or the remuneration for services; (3) 
make a trading counterpart give preferential treatment without justification; or 
(4) other abusive conducts by its market power.  Fair Trade Act, supra note 80.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art.4. 
88 Fair Trade Act, supra note 80, Art. 48. 
89 “Independent agency” means “a commission-type collegial 
organization that exercises its powers and functions independently without the 
supervision of other agencies, and operates autonomously unless otherwise 
stipulated.”  Zhongyang Xingzheng Jiguan Zuzhi Jizhunfa (中央行政機關組織基
準法) [Basic Code Governing Central Administrative Agencies Organizations], 
(promulgated by Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, Executive 
Yuan, June. 23, 2004, amended Feb. 3, 2010) (Taiwan), Art. 3.2, FAWUBU FAGUI 
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Taiwan), which, in accordance with Article 2 of the Fair Trade Act, 
has the authority to investigate and dispose of cases concerning Fair 
Trade Act violations.90  Therefore, the sanction made by TFTC to 
Qualcomm is an agency action in nature, meaning any appeals 
undergo judicial review by the Taipei Administrative High Court.91  
According to the reminders listed at the end of the TFTC’s ruling, 
Qualcomm was informed to bring any appeals to the Taipei 
Administrative High Court.  However, instead of suing in the Taipei 
Administrative High Court, Qualcomm sued the TFTC in the IP 
Court, a specialized court which has jurisdiction over intellectual 
property disputes, including relevant criminal, civil, and 
administrative disputes.92  Early in litigation, both parties had a minor 
dispute as to which court held jurisdiction.93  The TFTC insisted that 
the Taipei Administrative High Court was the legitimate forum, and 
Qualcomm argued that the IP Court has an overlapping jurisdiction 
over the subject matter.94 
The IP Court was established in 2008 to respond to the urgent 
need of a specialized court for the vigorous development in the 
technology industries of Taiwan.95  For decades, Taiwan has ranked 
as one of the most innovative countries in the world, especially in 
 
ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of 
China], https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0010036 
[https://perma.cc/7MTB-HFK4]. 
90 Fair Trade Act, supra note 80, Art. 2. 
91 See Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art.13 (stating that 
“The lawsuits of public legal persons shall be under the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court where the official office is located.  When the organization of 
a public legal person is the defendant, it shall be under the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court where the organization is located.”).  As the TFTC is located 
in Taipei City, any administrative complaint against the TFTC should be subject 
to the Taipei Administrative High Court’s review. 
92 Intellectual Property Court Organization Act, infra note 95, at Art. 3, 
¶1. 
93 This information is confidential trial material and not publicly 
available.  
94 This information is confidential trial material and not publicly 
available. 
95 See IPC—Creativity, Professionalism and Justice, INTELL. PROP. CT. 
(Dec. 15, 2020) (Taiwan), https://ipc.judicial.gov.tw/en/cp-677-4143-67051-
092.html [https://perma.cc/K7W8-FPTU] (describing the function and 
establishment of Intellectual Property Court in Taiwan).  
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technology. 96   Taiwan’s quantity of patent applications in world 
major markets has long been standing in the first tier when compared 
with other competitors. 97   In order to meet the demand from 
technology industries, both domestic and overseas, the IP Court is 
designed to consist of well-trained senior judges and well 
experienced technical examination officers mainly borrowed from 
the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office on a three year tenure,98 with 
which to ensure trials can be done with fewer technical errors through 
the cooperation of legal and technical experts.99  According to the 
Intellectual Property Court Organization Act (the enabling act of the 
court) article 3 paragraph 1 subparagraph 3, the IP Court has the 
jurisdiction of “[f]irst instance over administrative actions and 
compulsory enforcement actions concerning intellectual property 
rights arising under the Patent Act, Trademark Act, Copyright Act, 
Optical Disk Act, Regulations Governing the Protection of Integrated 
Circuits Configuration, Species of Plants and Seedling Act, or Fair 
 
96 Kate Whiting, These Are the World's 10 Most Innovative Economies, 
WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/these-are-the-worlds-10-most-
innovative-economies; Taiwan's Economy Ranks 5th in Innovation Potential, 
TAIWAN NEWS (Oct. 16, 2020), 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4031377. 
97 See World Intellectual Property Indicators, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Intellectual_Property_Indicators#Taiwanese
_Patents (note that statistics about Taiwan are normally merged with that of 
China) (last accessed May 19, 2021).  
98 See Zhihui Caichan Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (智慧財產法院組織法) 
[Intellectual Property Court Organization Act] (promulgated by Presidential 
Order Hwa-Tzong-1-Yi-Tze No. 09600035701, Mar. 28, 2007, amended and 
promulgated June 4, 2014) (Taiwan), Art. 16, SIFA YUAN (司法院) [JUDICIAL 
YUAN], 
https://www.tiplo.com.tw/files/Intellectual_Property_Court_Organization_Act_20
14-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSE7-J7S5] [hereinafter Intellectual Property Court 
Organization Act) (stating that a Technical Examination Officer of the IP Court 
shall have at least master degree or above from a graduate school, and have 
served as a Patent Examiner or Trademark Examiner or Assistant Examiner for 
over six years in total with good track record, or have been a lecturer of a 
university for six years in total, or an assistant professor, associate professor, or 
professor for over three years in total, etc.). 
99 See generally Related Laws & Regulations, INTELL. PROP. CT. (Dec. 
15, 2020) (Taiwan), https://ipc.judicial.gov.tw/en/cp-688-4220-2a286-092.html 
[https://perma.cc/2TJQ-5X2Q] (stating the laws and regulations regarding the 
technical examination officer). 
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Trade Act.”100  As the TFTC imposition of penalty upon Qualcomm 
was for the improper patent licensing activities of Qualcomm, and as 
the patent is an intellectual property right, in theory the IP Court shall 
have jurisdiction over the TFTC disputed administrative agency 
action in this case.  Since the IP Court Organization Act has so 
illustrated, the IP Court then agreed with Qualcomm’s argument that 
the Court has the jurisdiction over the case since it is an IP related fair 
trade dispute.101  The TFTC then withdrew its contrary argument.102 
Intervention in Litigation 
After the case was docketed with the IP Court, a total of six 
companies, including Apple Inc., and Intel etc., requested to 
intervene on the lawsuit,103 asserting that their legal rights or interests 
would have been affected by the result of the litigation.  These 
companies all directly or indirectly have business with Qualcomm 
and claimed to have suffered from Qualcomm’s unfair licensing 
 
100 Intellectual Property Court Organization Act, supra note 98, Art. 3, 
¶1. 
101 Id.  
102 See Minshi Susong Fa (民事訴訟法) [Taiwan Code of Civil 
Procedure] (promulgated by Presidential Order Hwa-Tzong-1-Yi-Tze No. 
11000004871, Feb. 1, 1935, amended Nov. 28, 2018), Arts. 24, 25, FAWUBU 
FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [LAWS AND REGULATIONS DATABASE OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0010001 
[https://perma.cc/H9R8-T93F] (stating in Art. 24 ¶ 1 that “[p]arties may, by 
agreement, designate a court of first instance to exercise jurisdiction, provided 
that such agreement relates to a particular legal relation[,]” and stating in Art. 25 
that “[a] court obtains jurisdiction over an action where the defendant proceeds 
orally on the merits without contesting lack of jurisdiction[,]” which make it 
possible for a court to obtain jurisdiction that was previously considered absent.  
However, the above mentioned articles are not applicable mutatis mutandis in 
administrative litigation). 
103 See Petitioner Apple Inc., et al., Zhihui Caichan Fayuan (智慧財產法
院) [Intell. Prop. Ct.], Xingzheng Caiding (行政裁定) [Admin. Ruling], 106 Xing 
Gongsu No. 1 (106年度行公訴字第 1號裁定) (2017) (Taiwan), at 1–3, 
https://law.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/data.aspx?ty=JD&id=IPCA,106%2c%e8%a1%8
c%e5%85%ac%e8%a8%b4%2c1%2c20180808%2c3 [https://perma.cc/M78K-
TR5D] (showing that six companies, including Apple Inc. and Intel Corporation, 
petitioned to intervene on Qualcomm Inc.’s lawsuit with the Fair Trade 
Commission). 
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policy, from which has caused different scales of damages for each 
of these companies, and hence made them qualified to intervene in 
the litigation.104  According to article 42 paragraph 1 of the TALA, if 
the Administrative Court finds that the outcome of the litigation 
proceedings may impair the rights or legal interests of a third party, 
the court may, ex officio, at the request of the third person, allow them 
to take part in the litigation proceedings independently.105  Thus, any 
third party, even government agencies,106 may apply to the court to 
participate in the litigation proceedings provided that they can prove 
to the court what interests they have in the proceedings and how their 
rights or legal interests may suffer, however, the court has the 
discretion of whether to grant it or not.107  In similar situations, where 
the court considers that the rights or legal interests of a third party are 
likely to be affected by the outcome of the settlement proceedings, 
the court may, under its discretion, notify the third party to intervene 
in the settlement proceedings independently. 108 The purpose of the 
admission for a third party to participate in the proceedings is to 
resolve all disputes in one procedure in order to save the costs of 
litigation and avoid creating any contradiction among parallel or 
subsequent cases.109 
 
104 Information based on the parties’ petition to intervene and not 
publicly available.  
105 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 42, ¶ 1. 
106 See Xingzheng Susong Fa (行政訴訟法) [Admin. Litig. Act] 
(promulgated by the Government, Nov. 17, 1932, amended Jan. 15, 2020) 
(Taiwan), Art. 44, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=a0030154 
[perma.cc/748F-9XVT] (stipulating in ¶ 1 that “[i]f the administrative court 
believes that other administrative agencies are necessary to assist one of the 
parties, it may order them to participate in the litigation[,]” and stating in ¶ 2 that 
“[t]he administrative agencies or interested third parties in the preceding 
paragraph may also petition to participate”). 
107 CHANG WUN-YU (張文郁), Quanli Yu Jiuji San, Shiti Yu Chengxu Zhi 
Jiaocuo (權利與救濟 (三 )實體與程序之交錯 ) [Rights and Remedies (III), 
Interleaving of Substantiality and Procedure], at 257 (2014). 
108 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219 ¶ 2. 
109 See CHEN, supra note 29, at 1429 (stating that the legislative purpose 
of admitting a third party to intervene is mainly to protect such third party’s 
interests, clarify the facts of the lawsuit, and save the costs of litigation by 
enhancing the effectiveness of the adjudication). 
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Another important reason for the notification of a third party 
to intervene on the litigation is to protect the rights of the affected 
third party,110 so that they would have the opportunity to state their 
opinions to the court.  Once the third party has been notified to 
participate in the proceedings, with or without his attendance, the 
outcome of the judgment in accordance with the law will have 
binding power on the notified participants.111  As mentioned above, 
the third party whose rights are affected, in accordance with the law, 
may apply to the court to participate not only in the trial proceedings, 
but also in the settlement proceedings. 112   The major difference 
between participation in settlement and participation in litigation is 
that in the trial proceedings, the court may ex officio actively notify 
a third party to participate, while in the settlement proceedings, the 
court will not ex officio actively notify the third party to participate, 
and the third party must acquire the court’s permission to participate, 
on which the court has the final decision whether to allow or not.113  
The main consideration in the court’s decision on whether to allow a 
third party to participate in the conciliation proceedings is 
necessity. 114   Since administrative litigation settlement is an 
alternative solution between the plaintiff and the defendant, the 
outcome of the settlement may eventually supersede the original 
adjudication made by the government agency, or even the court’s 
judgment.  Therefore, the willingness of the plaintiff and the 
defendant will be the major concern, and whether or not the 
 
110 See id. at 1431 (stating that if a third party’s rights or legal interests 
will be negatively impacted by the result of the lawsuit, the court shall ex officio 
order such third party to participate in the lawsuit independently, and permit such 
third party to participate in the lawsuit according to such third party’s petition). 
111 See Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 47 (stating that 
“[i]n accordance with the provisions of articles 41 and 42, the judgment is valid 
not only to those who have been ordered by the administrative court to participate 
in the trial proceeding but also to those who received the order but failed to 
participate”). 
112 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219 ¶ 2. 
113 See CHEN, supra note 29, at 1429 (explaining that when the third 
persons or affected persons contain a co-party status in nature with one of the 
litigants, the notification to intervene in the litigation becomes mandatory). 
114 See Chang, supra note 25, at 119 (explaining that the main reason 
why a third party is not considered necessary to intervene in a settlement 
proceeding is because the lack of disputed issues need to be adjudicated in a 
litigation together with litigants).  
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participation of a third party is helpful to the achievement of the 
settlement conditions will be the most important factor that the court 
has to consider.  Thus, the law confers that the court has the discretion 
on the third party’s request to participate in the settlement 
proceedings.115  Should the court find the third party’s participation 
in the settlement is not necessary, or likely to create hurdles for the 
achievement of the settlement, the court may deny the application. 
The IP Court ultimately refused Apple and others’ request to 
participate in the proceedings. 116   The main reason is that the 
imposition of the TFTC’s sanction upon Qualcomm is based on the 
evidence collected from the independent investigation initiated by the 
TFTC for the purpose of securing competing market order, not for the 
benefit of Apple et al. 117   Even though some of them reported 
Qualcomm’s improper behavior to the TFTC, requesting it to initiate 
an investigation procedure, it still rested on the TFTC’s discretion 
whether or not to investigate or even impose sanction upon 
Qualcomm.  As the Supreme Administrative Court previously opined: 
The petitioner is not the recipient of the government 
agency action.  Though they did report the case, which 
only prompted the TFTC to initiate the investigation, 
the petitioner does not have any right to claim in 
accordance with public law.  Petitioner stated that . . . 
if the agency sanction is revoked, it will enable Philips 
to continue to commit illegal acts, abuse patent rights, 
and expose the petitioner to long-term threats of 
litigation from Philips.  However, the influenced part 
of petitioner is only the economic or other de facto 
benefits, which is not sufficient to prove that his rights 
or legal interests will be damaged by the result of this 
lawsuit.  Therefore the petitioner’s requisition to 
participate in this lawsuit is inconsistent with the 
 
115 Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219 ¶ 2. 
116 See Petitioner Apple Inc., et al., supra note 103, at 3 (refusing 
petitioners’ request to participate in the lawsuit). 
117 Id.  
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above mentioned regulations and precedents.  The 
petition is thus denied.118 
Similarly, the agency action made by the TFTC should not in 
any way be considered a response to those who reported Qualcomm’s 
improper behavior.  As Qualcomm is the only one who suffered from 
TFTC’s sanction directly, not Apple et al, and the benefits or 
detriments Apple et al enjoyed or suffered are only the reflection from 
the government agency action, so as to the related industries. 119  
Therefore, it is groundless for Apple and others to participate in the 
proceedings.120   
In response to the negative decision of the IP Court, Mediatek 
appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, iterating that the 
sanction against Qualcomm substantially affected its competition 
ability in the market, hence qualified it to participate in the 
litigation.121  However, the appeal was ultimately rejected by the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 122   The Supreme Administrative 
Court did not explain whether or not Mediatek would have been 
affected by TFTC’s ruling, instead, the Supreme Administrative 
 
118 Petitioner Princo Co., Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) 
[Sup. Admin. Ct.], Xingzheng Caiding (行政裁定) [Admin. Ruling], 99 Cai 
Sheng No. 87 (99年裁聲字第 87號裁定) (2010) (Taiwan), 
https://law.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/data.aspx?ty=JD&id=TPAA,99%2c%e8%a3%8
1%e8%81%b2%2c87%2c20100909%2c1 [https://perma.cc/C2FE-77KB]. 
119 See Petitioner Apple Inc., et al., supra note 103. 
120 Regarding participation in litigation, one should prove to the court the 
interest sought to be protected is within the zone of interests guaranteed by the 
statute, and the causation and redressability between their adversely affected 
interest and the agency action.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
563 (1992) (“[I]t becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that 
those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation 
and permit redressability of injury.”). 
121 This information is based on the petitioner’s paper and not available 
to public.  
122 Zuigao Xinzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) [Sup. Admin. Ct.], 
Xingzheng Caiding (行政裁定) [Admin. Ruling],107 Cai No. 2040 (107年度裁
字第2040號裁定) (2019) (Taiwan). 
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Court considered that there was no ground or necessity for Mediatek 
to participate in a case which has already been closed.123  
Willingness to Reconcile 
After Qualcomm had filed a legal action against the TFTC, 
during the preliminary proceedings, the IP Court, in accordance with 
TALA article 219 paragraphs 1, inquired of Qualcomm and the TFTC 
about their willingness for settlement.  Qualcomm expressed to the 
court its willingness to communicate further in depth with the 
TFTC, 124  and if possible, Qualcomm was willing to reach a 
settlement with the TFTC.  Similarly, the TFTC attorney affirmed to 
convey Qualcomm’s opinions to the TFTC committee for further 
discussion.  Since Qualcomm and the TFTC both illustrated their 
willingness to communicate with each other, the court then requested 
that the two parties should negotiate with each other within a certain 
period of time and report the outcome of the communication to the 
court.  After a period of four months of negotiation back and forth 
between the two sides, Qualcomm and the TFTC eventually reached 
an agreement and reported the conclusion of the negotiation to the 
court accordingly. 
Conditions of Reconciliation 
Qualcomm’s settlement with the TFTC is divided into two 
parts, one of which is conditions both sides agreed to be disclosed to 
the public, and the other is to be kept confidential at the request of 
both parties. 125   In accordance with a press release issued by 
Qualcomm and the TFTC, Qualcomm committed to the following 
matters:  (a) Qualcomm will renegotiate in good faith with domestic 
mobile phone manufacturers and chip suppliers, continue to provide 
 
123 Supreme Administrative Court states: “The existence of a trial case at 
the court premises the intervention of a third party, if the trial case has separated 
from the court, then there is no ground for any third party to intervene.” 
124 According to the press release issued by TFTC, Qualcomm expressed 
its wiliness of settlement with TFTC to the Court.  See Gongping Jiaoyi 
Weiyuanhui Xinwen Ziliao (公平交易委員會新聞資料) [TFTC Press Release 
Material], TFTC (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/b5140eaa-99e4-
46b3-a9f4-a65273bdcb67.pdf [https://perma.cc/L78T-7T84]. 
125 This information is confidential court file not available to public.  
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chips in accordance with FRAND126  requirement during the time 
period of negotiation, and cease taking further legal actions or 
withdraw from all pending legal cases; (b) Qualcomm has an 
obligation to report to the TFTC not only the implementation 
situation of the agreement on a frequency of once every six months 
for a period of five years but also the situation of any newly signed 
or revised contracts with domestic mobile phone manufacturers or 
chip suppliers within 30 days whenever the contracts have been 
signed; (c) Qualcomm agreed not to dispute the $88 million NTD fine 
it had paid and promised to undertake a five-year industrial 
investment program in Taiwan (investments including 5G 
cooperation, new market expansion, cooperation with start-ups and 
universities, and the establishment of a Taiwan based operations and 
manufacturing engineering center).127   
The above-mentioned settlement conditions rely on 
Qualcomm’s sincerity and willingness to perform, in order to 
guarantee Qualcomm would realize the conditions in accordance with 
the terms of the settlement, one of the proposals suggested that 
Qualcomm should be required to submit a very substantial deposit, 
which will not be returned until Qualcomm has actually fulfilled its 
obligations in accordance with the settlement conditions.128  In the 
end, however, this suggestion was not adopted, but alternatively, 
Qualcomm had to regularly report to the TFTC its progress in 
implementing the terms of the settlement.129   
 
126 FRAND stands for fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing 
policy.  It is a promise committed by the right holder (normally the patent right 
holders, especially those of SEPs) to industry standard-setting organizations 
(“SSOs”) in exchange for the recognition of a universal standard of its innovation.  
SEP right holders may constitute patent right misuse or abuse if they violate the 
FRAND agreement in licensing business later.  See Case C-170/13 Huawei 
Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.J., ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 
(explaining the meaning of FRAND and how the term works).   
127 For details of the conditions, see FTC News Release, FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N (Aug. 10, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=179&docid=155
65 [https://perma.cc/D9JD-5SEE] (last visited May 28, 2021) (introducing the 
conditions Qualcomm agreed to undertake). 
128 TFTC commissioner opinions are recorded in TFTC file and not 
available for non-trial use.  
129 Id.  
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Factors Considered by the Court 
In the settlement proceedings, Qualcomm agreed to 
renegotiate the terms of the license in good faith with the mobile 
phone manufacturers and to grant SEP license on a FRAND basis for 
mobile communications standards, while not supplying only chips 
during the renegotiation; for the chip supplier portion, Qualcomm 
undertook not to bring any action against the chip suppliers without 
first filing a license clause based on the principle of fairness, 
reasonableness, and non-discrimination clauses with the chip 
suppliers regarding the necessary patents for mobile communication 
standards.130  And if Qualcomm signs an exhausted authorization of 
chips for the necessary patents for mobile communication standards 
or grants a third person non-claim of rights, Qualcomm will provide 
the same conditions to the chip suppliers.131  In addition to making 
these commitments and agreeing to end unfair competition in patent 
licensing, Qualcomm has also committed to establishing test centers 
in Taiwan,132 help improve 5G technology and product development, 
and assist Taiwan manufacturers to expand global markets.133  The IP 
Court, after having considered all factors, listening to the statements 
from both sides, including the information of vigorous development 
of Taiwan’s mobile communications technology, the momentum that 
could be generated through the cooperation of domestic and foreign 
experts and the benefits which could be created therefrom, granted 
Qualcomm’s settlement with the TFTC to complete the litigation 
settlement process. 134   Aforementioned considerations helped 
encourage the court to make its final decision. 
One should bear in mind that the promises Qualcomm 
committed in the settlement should in no way be deemed as an 




132 The new building of the research and test center has broken ground in 
June 2019 in Xin Zhu.  Gaotong Xieshou Taichang Qianggong 5G, Xindalou 
Donggong (高通携手台厂抢攻 5G，新大楼动工) [Qualcomm Joins Hands with 
Taiwanese Factories to Break Ground on New 5G Building], LIBERTY TIMES NET 
(June 28, 2019), https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1299105 
[https://perma.cc/J8HG-2JL3 (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).  
133 See FTC News Release, supra note 127. 
134 Id. 
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fault, Qualcomm would be punished again should it fail to fulfill its 
duty in accordance with the conditions listed in the settlement or 
should it commit further improper activities in the future.135 
IV. CRITICISMS 
The TFTC’s Consent to Settlement Violates its Duty 
Most of the criticism of the settlement agreement focused on 
the TFTC’s end of the agreement.136  An example of a criticism levied 
at the TFTC was why it believed that Qualcomm’s commitment to 
future investments in Taiwan’s 5G industries along with other 
promises would make up for damages caused by its improper 
licensing policy?137  
Before answering that question, one should understand that 
deciding whether to prosecute or enforce an agency’s decision is 
entirely subjected to the agency’s discretion.138   When making a 
decision, each government agency, regardless of its dependency, 
must go through a formal procedure in order for it to reach a 
conclusion, regardless of whether the agency is a committee system 
or a purely single head system.139  The totality of the procedure thus 
constitutes the mechanism of decision making, through which 
legitimacy and  legality of government agency action will become 
primary issues for judicial review when dispute arise later.  
Throughout several rounds of negotiation during settlement 
 
135 Id.  In according to the principle of res judicata, newly happened 
incident will not be precluded by the former judgment; therefore, Qualcomm will 
be subject to another punishment if it does commit another improper business 
activity after the settlement.  See Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, 
Art. 107 ¶ 1 (9). 
136 See Liu Kung-Chung, From Not Prepared to Handle, Unable to 
Handle, to Unwilling to Handle the Issue of Standard Essential Patent FRAND 
Authorization, 296 TAIWAN L. REV. 173, 181−88 (2020) (criticizing the TFTC for 
reaching a settlement with Qualcomm).  
137 Id.  
138 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has 
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to 
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision 
generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”) 
139 See Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act, Arts. 102–09 (2002) 
(laying out the procedural rights the subject of an administrative disposition has to 
state a statement of opinion and hearing). 
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proceedings, Qualcomm proposed various sets of commitments it 
could possibly make. 140   Pros and cons of every proposed 
commitment was analyzed and debated in depth by both sides.141  
Before the TFTC made its final decision, the contents of the 
settlement agreement were scrutinized by the committee members.  
While the TFTC committee’s vote in favor of a settlement agreement 
was close, 142  it does not imply that the TFTC’s approval of the 
settlement was reckless or arbitrary. 
One criticism of the TFTC argues that, as an independent 
organization,143 the TFTC is supposed to protect the domestic market, 
secure the interests of consumers and ensure free and fair 
competition.144   Therefore, if it had been proven that Qualcomm 
committed improper activities that hampered the domestic 
competition environment, the sanction imposed upon Qualcomm 
should have been upheld.  Any factor outside the scope of ensuring 
fair competition, such as economic factors, should not have been 
taken into consideration by the TFTC.  The TFTC’s agreement to 
settle with Qualcomm weakens its authority and purpose.145 
 
140 The details of the proposed commitment is confidential and therefore 
not publicly available. 
141 The details of the proposed commitment is confidential and therefore 
not publicly available. 
142 Two dissented commissioners believed to have been betrayed by their 
colleague and resigned after the TFTC had signed the settlement agreement with 
Qualcomm.  See [The TFTC] Agreed to Qualcomm Investment Instead of 
Fines―2 Fair Trade Commissioners Resigned Angrily and Criticized [the TFTC 
for] “Putting the Cart Before the Horse”, UP MEDIA (Aug. 11, 2018), 
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=46061 
[https://perma.cc/Q43V-NYZQ].  
143 Besides for the TFTC, there are five independent agencies in Taiwan.  
They include  the National Communications Commission, the Central Bank, the 
Financial Supervisory Commission, the Transportation Safety Board and the 
Central Election Commission.  These independent agencies are required to 
faithfully implement their duties without tilting toward any specific person, 
political parties, or interest groups.  
144 See Ceng, infra note 145.  
145 See Yan Ting-Dong & Zhang Hong Hao, Can Qualcomm's Settlement 
Really Work? HOUSEFUN |NEWS| (Aug. 11, 2018), 
https://news.housefun.com.tw/news/article/100599203933.html 
[https://perma.cc/YF8V-GWCR] (arguing that by agreeing to settle with 
Qualcomm, the TFTC is weakening its authority and not doing its job); Ceng Zhi-
Chao, Complexity of the Qualcomm Settlement Case, NAT’L POL’Y FOUND. (July 
3, 2019), https://www.npf.org.tw/3/20981 [https://perma.cc/Q6V7-YPHY] (“The 
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This criticism is only partially correct.  The Fair Trade Act 
article 1 states that “[t]his Act is enacted for the purposes of 
maintaining trading order, protecting consumers interests, ensuring 
free and fair competition, and promoting economic stability and 
prosperity.” 146   As described by the plain meaning of the Act, 
“economic stability and prosperity” are also factors that the TFTC 
must consider when executing the law.147  In the Qualcomm case, the 
primary concern was to punish Qualcomm for its improper licensing 
and restrictive claims to others in the past and prohibit it from doing 
the same in the future.148  A secondary concern was to ensure that 
domestic communication industries are not hampered by the agency’s 
actions.  The first concern was achieved by imposing a large fine on 
Qualcomm.149  As to the second concern, it could be argued that the 
large fine originally imposed on Qualcomm was enough to deter it 
from further improper activities, and that the sanctions could even 
help promote the domestic competitive environment.  However, that 
argument  only holds true with respect to Qualcomm’s horizontal 
competition.  As noted earlier, Qualcomm owns many patents in 
CDMA, WCDMA and LTE related technologies, some of which 
overlap with what some Taiwan-based competitors have been 
 
first thing that was injured was the prestige of the law enforcement of the fair as 
an independent agency!”). 
146 Fair Trade Act, supra note 80, Art. 1. 
147See Xu You-Ning, The Development Trend of the Qualcomm Case—
The Judgment of the U.S. Federal District Court and Taiwan Fair Trade 
Commission's Settlement with Qualcomm, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
INSTITUTE (Sept. 10, 2019), https://stli.iii.org.tw/article-
detail.aspx?no=64&tp=1&d=8322 [https://perma.cc/Q7LB-JJFV] (countering 
criticism of the TFTC’s economic development motivation in the Qualcomm 
settlement with the Fair Trade Law’s requirement that the legal system promote 
economic stability). 
148 See Gaotong Longduan Shichang Xingwei, Woguo Gongpinghui 
Zhongfa 234 yi (高通壟斷市場行為，我國公平會重罰234億) [Heavy Fine for 
Qualcomm by the Fair Trade Commission for Monopoly Practices], INNOVATION 
KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID=13852 
[https://perma.cc/DS2Z-HQXZ]. 
149 See Taishang dui Gaotong de Aihenjiuge (台廠對高通的愛恨糾葛) 
[Taiwanese Manufacturers’ Love-hate Relationship with Qualcomm], TECH 
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researching for a while.  MediaTek,150 for example, is a non-factory 
semiconductor company that provides system chip solutions for 
wireless communications, high-quality televisions, DVDs and Blu-
ray discs, and also considered a horizontal competitor of Qualcomm.  
Companies like MediaTek think that the TFTC’s sanctions against 
Qualcomm definitely promote a more competitive environment.151 
However, companies that rely heavily on Qualcomm’s 
advanced technologies would simply hope to build a firm relationship 
with Qualcomm and get the support they need at a reasonable price, 
rather than drive Qualcomm out of the Taiwan market.  These 
companies, which have a quasi-vertical relationship with 
Qualcomm,152 worry that the TFTC’s sanction against Qualcomm 
may frustrate further cooperation in many ways.153  While allowing 
 
150 MediaTek provided a brief of amicus curiae at the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in support of the appellee in FTC v. 
Qualcomm.  Brief for Mediatek Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122), 
2019 WL 3502777. 
151 MediaTek has being insisted that TFTC should implement its sanction 
against Qualcomm.  Analyst considers MediaTek would be the one suffered most 
from the settlement.  See Gongpinghui yu Gaotong Hejie wei Changye Bandaoti 
ye bu Maidan (公平會與高通和解為產業 半導體業不買單) [Fair Trade 
Commission Settles with Qualcomm to Help the Industry, Yet the Semiconductor 
Industry Doesn’t Buy It], CTR. NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://tw.news.yahoo.com/公平會與高通和解為產業-半導體業不買單-
105928194.html [https://perma.cc/8Z85-ZR88]. 
152 TSMC is one of the companies which has vertical cooperation 
relationship with Qualcomm, according to analysis, TFTC 's settlement with 
Qualcomm may further advance the domestic related industries in the future.  See 
Gaotong Dacheng Hejie Xuezhe: Chuangzao san Ying Jumian (高通達成和解 學
者：創造三贏局面) [Qualcomm Settles, Scholar: Win-Win for Three Parties], 
CTR. NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 10, 2018), https://tw.news.yahoo.com高通達成和解-
學者-創造三贏局面-065417357.html [https://perma.cc/WJQ3-ESK3]. 
153 See The Industrial Technology Research Institute Confirms that 
Qualcomm’s 5G Cooperation Case has been Suspended, UP MEDIA (Oct. 25, 
2017), https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=27528 
[https://perma.cc/73R9-TFWN].  See also Jingjibu, Gongpinghui wei Gaotong An 
Chaofantian (經濟部、公平會為高通案吵翻天) [The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Fair Trade Commission in Heated Argument Over the Qualcomm 
Case], CREDERE MEDIA (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.cmmedia.com.tw/home/articles/6354 
[https://perma.cc/AR2W-P9GH]. 
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Qualcomm to continue its improper licensing activities would violate 
Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act, and is a reason for sanctioning Qualcomm, 
nevertheless, these sanctions would not solve the conundrum that 
domestic companies would encounter.  Sanctions alone would not be 
helpful for the  advancement of technology.154  Voices for a peaceful 
multilateral beneficiary solution were equally as loud as those 
advocating for punishment.  After thorough evaluation, the TFTC 
considered litigation settlement the better solution, which on the one 
hand can direct the once distorted and unfair competition back on 
track but on the other hand, it could help improve the development of 
local communication technology.155  The TFTC’s decision did not 
exceed the power it is delegated nor violate the purpose the Fair Trade 
Act is expected to achieve.156  Besides, the TFTC’s decision still falls 
 
154 Apple’s settlement with Qualcomm in the United States somehow 
reflects the desperate need of cooperation for companies who have a quasi-
vertical partner style relationship with Qualcomm in CDMA, WCDMA, and LTE 
technologies.  See David Faber & Kif Leswing, Qualcomm Surges After 
Announcing a Settlement with Apple over Patent Royalties, CNBC (Updated Apr. 
17, 2019, 5:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/16/apple-qualcomm-settle-
royalty-dispute-sources-say.html [https://perma.cc/6EQD-KPPQ]; Pingguo yu 
Gaotong Dacheng Hejie (蘋果與高通達成和解) [Apple and Qualcomm Reaches 
Settlement], BUS. NEXT (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/52952/apple-and-qualcomm-to-
drop-all-litigation [https://perma.cc/85W8-B3NS].  Apple case implied that 
cooperation, not sanction, is the better solution for the development of that 
specific industry. 
155 In a May 21, 2019 press release, the TFTC stated that after 
considering the benefits of the competition mechanism under the regular 
operation and the promotion of industrial economic benefits, it believes that 
settling the case, instead of taking action, will promote the public interest in 
addition to rapidly solving the administrative dispute.  Press Release, Taiwan Fair 
Trade Com’n, The [Taiwan] Fair Trade Commission and Qualcomm’s Litigation 
Settlement, https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/14f21b11-a9b0-4119-b575-
d475db2a93f9.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK3F-ZXEN]. 
156 Since economic stability and prosperity are explicit factors that the 
TFTC should consider when implementing its authority, the TFTC’s settlement 
which was partially based on national economic benefit considerations are not 
arbitrary or capricious.  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 
458 (2001) (indicating that the Environmental Protection Agency has the power to 
consider implementation costs with national air quality standards when making 
rules). 
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within its realm of discretion of a specialized authority, a territory in 
which other government branches should defer.157  
Transparency 
Another critique for the Qualcomm settlement was the 
transparency of the conditions both parties agreed upon and the denial 
of petition for participation of concerning companies.  The criticism 
in fact focuses on one single issue, the openness of the procedure.158  
Since Qualcomm and the TFTC both expressed their willingness to 
reach a litigation settlement at the beginning of the trial, the court had 
to assess the necessity of intervention of concerning companies for 
the achievement of the settlement respectively.  As explained above, 
Qualcomm was the only company who directly suffered the sanction 
imposed by the TFTC, which thus qualified it to file a complaint 
against the TFTC in accordance with the law.  Those who were 
unfairly licensed by Qualcomm, though benefited from the TFTC’s 
agency action against Qualcomm, did not have any standing to 
participate in the settlement.  They can only urge Qualcomm to 
license based on the TFTC’s requirement of FRAND condition, 
which is purely a benefit reflected from that agency action.  The 
reflected benefits cannot be considered a “legal right” to participate 
in the settlement.159 
Besides, part of the settlement conditions involving 
Qualcomm’s future deployment and management worldwide, for the 
sake of fair competition, were considered not suitable to be released 
to the public.160  Should those concerning companies be allowed to 
 
157 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
866 (1984) (stating that when a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, the challenge will fail). 
158  See Liu Kung-Chung, On the Practice and Jurisprudence of the 
Administrative Reconciliation of the Fair Trade Commission, 235 TAIPEI BAR J. 
68, 68 (1999) (explaining the belief shared by some scholars that the details of 
litigation settlement should be made public for review in order to prevent improper 
bargains between government agencies and private persons). 
159 Chang, supra note 25, at 119.  
160 Unlike the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 574, 
TAPA does not provide any regulation or guideline relating to the confidentiality 
of the dispute resolution proceedings, nor does TALA, IP Court hence referred to 
Intellectual Property Case Adjudication Act Art. 9 and decided not to release details 
of the settlement. 
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participate in the settlement procedure, the confidentiality of the 
content of the settlement would not likely be secured as expected.  
Therefore, the content of the settlement and the proceess of making 
the settlement possible, to some extent, will have to be kept opaque 
instead of transparent.  
Does Qualcomm Deserve a Settlement? 
Some argue that Qualcomm not only licensed with 
unreasonable conditions to vertical and horizontal counterparts in 
Taiwan, but it also behaved the same way in every major market in 
the world, causing it to be sanctioned by government agencies in 
many different jurisdictions.161  From a comparative perspective, the 
TFTC should not be the first national authority to spare Qualcomm’s 
fault and retrieve the sanction it has imposed.  The TFTC’s retreat 
implied its inaccuracy of making the first agency action. 
Qualcomm did violate many regulations and deserve harsh 
punishment.  The TFTC’s sanction not only punishes Qualcomm for 
its past improper activities, but also deters Qualcomm from 
committing further violations of the law.  As punishment and 
deterrence are the major issues that draw public concerns, therefore, 
any measures that can achieve similar effects should be considered 
feasible options. 
According to the conditions consented in the settlement, 
Qualcomm has agreed to not dispute the $88 million NTD fine it has 
 
161 Qualcomm was sanctioned in almost every major jurisdiction, 
including the US, the EU, South Korea, China, and Japan.  See JFTC Revokes 
Order, Finds Qualcomm Licensing Program Lawful, QUALCOMM (Mar. 14, 
2019), https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2019/03/14/jftc-revokes-order-
finds-qualcomm-licensing-program-lawful [https://perma.cc/296G-TGEF] 
(describing that the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a cease-and-
desist order to Qualcomm in the year 2009 confining Qualcomm from improper 
cross-licensing activities.  Following a nine-year evidentiary proceeding, JFTC 
reversed the order itself).  See also Korea Fair Trade Commission defeats 
Qualcomm's antitrust appeal in court, but Qualcomm will appeal—and violate—
further, FOSS PATENTS (Dec. 7, 2019), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/12/korea-fair-trade-commission-defeats.html 
[https://perma.cc/N7AW-FSCY] (describing the sanctioning of Qualcomm in 
Korea); Qualcomm.Inc., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0199/qualcomm-inc 
[https://perma.cc/JJP6-VMCL] (describing the sanctioning of Qualcomm in the 
U.S.).  
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paid, has promised that it will renegotiate in good faith with domestic 
mobile phone manufacturers and chip suppliers, has agreed to 
continue to provide chips in accordance with FRAND requirement 
during the time period of negotiation, and has agreed to cease taking 
further legal actions or withdraw all pending legal cases, etc., all of 
which seem to meet the “punishment and prevention” purpose the 
advocates of harsh punishment called for.162  As the TFTC never 
agreed to excuse Qualcomm’s future improper activities, Qualcomm 
might still be sanctioned should it commit any further inappropriate 
deeds.  One might still argue that the settlement heavily relies on 
Qualcomm’s good will, and that an insurance which lacks any legal 
policy is meaningless.  As pros and cons do always exist in almost 
every social policy and public concerns in every aspect, it is likely 
impossible to achieve a perfect solution and satisfy every interest 
group for every controversy.  And, since Qualcomm is already deeply 
rooted in Taiwan, it seems still too early to anticipate whether 
Qualcomm will risk its reputation in the domestic market, and 
worldwide as well.  Therefore, it is simply too early to conclude 
whether or not Qualcomm will dishonor its promises or should it 
deserve the settlement this far. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Government agencies, delegated by Taiwan’s Legislative 
Yuan (equivalent to the Congress in the U.S.), have the power to 
make rules, enforce policies, and punish those who violate the 
regulations promulgated by them; however they must still comply 
with legal norms when executing their duties.  When making 
decisions, government agencies must give consideration to both the 
public good and private interests.  When different interests are in 
conflict, public interests should normally prevail.  However, when 
interpretations of public interests vary, the Legislative Yuan did not 
explain who will be the most suitable authority to give the final 
definition.  The confusion can only be clarified by referring to the 
designer's blueprint of democracy.  According to the principles of 
 
162 See FTC News Release, supra note 127. 
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“checks and balances”163 and “separation of powers”,164 the judiciary 
should be the one to oversee duties or responsibility through the 
mechanism of judicial review of government agencies actions.165  
When reviewing, there are still some domains where the judicial 
branch is not allowed to lay its hand, such as the decision made in 
accordance with the expertise of a government agency.166  Should the 
government agency action be proven not arbitrary or capricious, the 
judicial branch normally defers.167   
As explained above, government agencies are supposed to 
evaluate and balance contradictory interests before making decisions.  
In other words, any government agency made decision is supposed to 
have considered every relevant interest.168  The court can only review 
the agency's actions after they have been made.  And, due to the lack 
of resources of expertise, and for the sake of the principle of the 
separation of powers169  and the deference to the expertise of the 
 
163 See Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, 
and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO L. REV. 175, 183 (1990) (detailing the 
principle of checks and balances and how it would be carried out). 
164 Id. at 182−186.  See also KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 38–40 (2nd ed. 2014); Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (explaining the principle of separation of 
powers). 
165 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706.  See also Bowen v. Michigan Acad. Fam. 
Physician, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) 
166 See Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 
(describing that, other than the discretionary realm of the government agency, the 
agency’s conduct must fall within the definition of “agency action” in order to 
qualify for judicial review).   
167 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843−44 (1984). 
168 In fact, TFTC formulates an internal guideline called “Principles for 
handling Administrative Settlement for the Fair Trade Commission,” providing 
the factors which should be considered when committing to administrative 
settlement.  According to the Art. 2 of the guideline, the factors are: (1) 
legitimacy and appropriateness of the concession; (2) the maintenance of public 
interest; and (3) damages that the interested party may suffer as a result of the 
settlement.  TFTC, 
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=175&docid=288 
[https://perma.cc/K78B-5JC5] (last visited May 28, 2021).  
169 For a better understanding of the system and function, see Keith 
Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2681, 2682–83 
(1996) (describing the powers granted to the federal government and the 
separation of powers). 
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administrative agency, the judicial branch should not make decisions 
on behalf of the government agency.  Unless the agency’s action is 
inconsistent with its prior precedents or rules,170  otherwise courts 
normally defer, even to that of the discretionary decision of 
distribution of regulatory benefits. 171   As the Supreme Court of 
United States explained in Heckler v. Chaney172 that administrative 
decision making “often involves a complicated balancing of a number 
of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.”  
However, if the interest gained from the execution of the agency 
action upon people is lesser than the national interest for which the 
action is supposed to achieve, whether to continue the agency action 
should then be prudently reconsidered. 
 
Figure 1: Settlement Rate 
 
 
170 See, e.g., Clifford v. Peña, 77 F.3d 1414, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that the federal agency acted consistently with prior precedents and 
rules); Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1556 
(7th Cir. 1985) (finding that CFTC need only comply and enforce its own rules). 
171 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 
(1972) (holding that a non-tenured professor is not entitled to review his dismissal 
even if no reasons were provided); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 
(1988) (“[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal 
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an 
employee to follow.”). 
172 Heckler v. Chaney 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
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In Taiwan, it is rare to settle administrative disputes in trial 
proceedings, and it is even rarer to settle large monetary value 
administrative disputes, such as Qualcomm’s case.  According to the 
statistics (see chart above), the settlement rate of the Taiwan High 
Court civil cases is almost 5 to 6 times higher than the cases of the 
Taiwan Administrative High Court in the time period from 2009 to 
2017.  In the year 2017 the gap between total cases and cases settled 
surprisingly reached almost 10 times.  One major reason for the 
rareness of achieving a settlement in administrative trial proceeding 
is the anxiety of the executive authorities’ consideration for the 
unnecessary public suspicion a settlement may cause.173  For example, 
whether or not there is any improper exchange of interests between 
the executive authorities and the punished persons.  Unlike civil cases, 
administrative cases usually involve public interests or fundamental 
administrative principles that are applicable to all pending or future 
cases, sometimes even to government agencies’ decision 
making.  Therefore, compared with their colleagues in civil court, 
administrative court judges are more reluctant to risk the unnecessary 
suspicion from the public to convince the involving parties to settle 
the case.174  
Taking Qualcomm and the TFTC litigation settlement for 
example, after the settlement was achieved by the two parties; the 
involved industries have different opinions, the Control Yuan175 has 
 
173 Other considerations like budget control from the supervisory 
authority and administrative supervision from superior authority etc. always make 
government agencies reluctant to commit to settlement in litigation.  LIOU & 
PENG, supra note 31, at 493. 
174 For details of the critiques of court dominated settlement procedure, 
see WU GENG & CHANG WUN-YU, ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE LAW 473–474 
(2018) (criticizing judges for pushing parties to settle for the sole purpose of 
avoiding the trouble of litigating and writing court opinions). 
175 The Control Yuan is the highest supervision branch of the state which 
has the power to supervise the government and censure all public servants, 
including the judicial branch.  According to Art. 24 of the Control Act stipulates 
that the Control Yuan, after investigating the work and facilities of the Executive 
Yuan and its subordinate organizations, shall propose corrective measures to the 
Executive Yuan or its subordinate organs for improvement after these measures 
have been deliberated and approved by the relevant committee meetings.  After 
receiving the proposal, the Executive Yuan or related organizations shall make 
improvements or take other actions immediately and reply to the Control Yuan in 
writing.  The Control Yuan can also impeach all civil servants, those in the 
judicial branch included.  The aforementioned system was designed in accordance 
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proposed a correction to the TFTC,176 and the Legislative Yuan177 
requires the Chairman of the TFTC to report to the Legislative 
Council,178 all of which are sufficient to illustrate the challenges that 
may arise from the litigation settlement.  
As in any trial case, the considerations or interests of both 
sides are always contradicted, and the outcome of the proceedings is 
unlikely to satisfy everyone involved.  Similarly, the outcome of the 
settlement is unlikely to satisfy everyone whose rights or interests are 
affected.  Reconciliation, after all, is the second-best option for both 
sides.  From the perspective of saving litigation costs, speeding up 
 
with the concept of Dr. Sun Yet-Sen, the founding father of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan).  According to Dr. Sun’s concept, the impeachment power of the 
legislative branch was separated and transferred to the Control Yuan, which 
constitutes a major difference between Taiwan and the Constitution of U.S. Art. 
1, §§ 6-7.  For more information about the political system of Taiwan, please refer 
to GOVERNMENT PORTAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN), 
https://taiwan.gov.tw/3866.php (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
176 The Control Yuan considered that TFTC’s settlement with 
Qualcomm, agreeing on Qualcomm’s promises to sign a “no mutual complaint” 
contract with competitors in the industry, as well as to expand investment in 
exchange for fines, not only has excessively intervened in the market mechanism, 
but also violated the principle of prohibition of improper connection.  The 
settlement negotiation was completed in only 4 months, and the process was 
hasty, the procedure was not open and transparent.  The Supervisory Office of the 
Control Yuan therefore proposed to correct the Fair Trade Commission.  See 
generally Gongpinghui yu Gaotong Gongsi Dacheng Hejie (公平會與高通公司
達成和解) [Fair Trade Commission and Qualcomm Reaches Settlement], 
CONTROL YUAN (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.cy.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=124&sms=8912&s=13429 
[https://perma.cc/CC2U-DVU2] (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
177 The Legislative Yuan of Taiwan has the power to decide by 
resolution upon statutory or budgetary (final accounts) bills, or bills concerning 
martial law, amnesties, declarations of war or peace, treaties, and other important 
affairs of the state.  For details, please refer to LEGISLATIVE YUAN, REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (TAIWAN) https://www.ly.gov.tw/EngPages/List.aspx?nodeid=345 
[https://perma.cc/3DEP-T8WS] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020) (describing functions 
of different entities in Taiwanese government). 
178 Zhonghua Minguo Lifa Yuan (中華民國立法院) [The Legislature 
Yuan of R.O.C.], Dijiujie Diqi Huiqi Jingji Weiyuanhui Dishisi Ci Quanti 
Weiyuan Huiyi (第九屆第七會期經濟委員會第十四次全體委員會議) [The 
Fourteenth Committee Meeting of the Seventh Session of the Ninth Term of the 
Economic Committee] available at 
https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=33132&pid=183194 
[https://perma.cc/E3DH-THVL] (Chinese version, last visited Jun. 17, 2020).  
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dispute resolution, and seeking the best interests of the litigants as a 
whole, litigation settlement still has its value.  In order to reduce 
suspicion, the administrative court must ensure that the public interest 
will not be sacrificed and that the overall interests of the state can be 
secured.  Although sometimes the benefit of litigation settlement to 
public interests may not emerge immediately, the efficacy of 
litigation settlement still cannot be ignored. 
Through Qualcomm’s litigation settlement with the TFTC, 
this paper explains the relevant provisions of Taiwan’s 
Administrative Litigation Act on litigation settlement, as well as the 
role and reasoning of the court in the litigation settlement process.  
From a result-oriented theory, Qualcomm’s case is a successful 
example.  However, this does not mean that all administrative 
disputes are suitable for litigation settlement; the court still has to be 
cautious and prudent when handling each and every case.  
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